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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RAMSEYER,
PREDICTING COURT OUTCOMES THROUGH
POLITICAL PREFERENCES
MICHAEL BOUDIN†
Two quotations derived from Professor Ramseyer’s article
provide a point of departure. One is from Judge Harry Edwards who,
apropos of a study correlating appointing presidents with voting
patterns on the D.C. Circuit, remarks on “the heedless observations
of academic scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work
1
of . . . judges.” The other is Professor Ramseyer’s reply that Judge
Edwards “misses the point” because the (alleged) fact that judges
“act politically in political cases simply reflects their essential
independence”; this, Professor Ramseyer said, in an earlier draft,
2
should not “embarrass” the judges but “should engender pride.”
Figuring out why judges decide cases the way they do is a worthy
enterprise; not so scoring judicial results as “political.” True, a layman
might be surprised were he to listen in on a semble—the meeting in
which judges, after oral arguments, meet to discuss their tentative
views. Discussion is not confined to abstract rules or the parsing of
precedents. But the balance of considerations even in highly charged
cases could hardly be described as “political” in the common sense of
reflecting partisan politics. The charged term “political” could be
used only by extending it to include almost any kind of practical
consideration—as opposed to pure precedent.
Practical considerations are likely to get weight whenever the law
allows some latitude for judgment—as it typically does in cases any
lawyer thinks worth appealing. Examples might be whether the
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defendant is clearly guilty or arguably innocent, whether the trial
judge competently conducted the proceedings below, whether (in a
lay sense) the result is just or unjust, whether further litigation (for
example, by a remand) would be a waste of time and money, and
whether an issue is well-enough briefed to be safely decided. The list
could go on and on.
These considerations are often connected to legal rules. Thus,
the weight of evidence as to guilt or innocence may bear on whether
an error was prejudicial; adequacy of briefing may be relevant to
forfeiture of an issue in the appeal. In all events, common-sense
assessments of this kind are inherent: deciding cases is not about
abstractions but about getting real-world controversies resolved with
such fairness and predictability as fallible beings and imperfect
institutions can manage.
Leeway is often present in cases in which public policy issues are
at stake. Statutes, often unclear in their wording, may also be unclear
in their purpose and legislative history. Constitutional provisions are
often cast in vague terms (“freedom of speech” or “equal
protection”). Common law doctrine evolves in light of experience and
expectations. Canons that purport to reflect public policy conflict with
one another. Judges ought to put aside personal preferences, but they
can hardly avoid bringing a worldview to the choices that many such
cases present.
How one thinks that the world works—for example, how reliable
is eyewitness identification or how widespread is discrimination
against a type of disability—may be as important as any value
judgment in framing rules or making decisions in cases. On both
scores, predictions are possible as to an individual’s outlook. So some
correlation between the views of an appointing president and the
outlook of an appointed judge is hardly surprising, although
Theodore Roosevelt was famously unhappy with Holmes and
Eisenhower with Warren.
But to call judges’ subsequent choices in public policy cases
“political” is mere provocation. One can reply blandly that these
decisions are political in the sense that they relate to public policy,
but few lay readers (or judges) will take it that way. Policy often
matters in deciding cases, but it is usually policy attributable to
Congress or to public policy reflected in case law, common sense, and
the values of the community. Where exactly should judges look when
existing law stops short?
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There is blame enough to go around. Judicial decisions often
convey the sense that the result reached follows mechanically from
clear and fixed legal rules. Sometimes this is so, but difficult cases are
as much about creating law as discovering it. Judges may feel uneasy
at the freedom open to them, but choice is inevitable in judging and
the public’s confidence could well be enhanced by decisions that face
up this necessity and offer reasons that most would think sensible for
whatever choice is made.
Among judges most admired for the quality of their work are
those, like Robert Jackson and Learned Hand, who most fully and
often in highly practical terms explained just how they came to their
conclusions. It is no wonder that decisions like Youngstown Sheet &
3
4
Tube Co. v. Sawyer and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. retain
their force even today. Law is assuredly based on rules, but the rules
are often unclear and perpetually incomplete or (like sand castles at
the beach) are perfected and then undermined by new conditions.
On balance, more candor from the courts would likely be a good
thing—not only about how judges think and what they rely upon in
deciding cases, but also about workload, time pressure, isolation, use
of law clerks, and other aspects of the job. Disclosure, like everything
else, has reasonable outer limits but they have not yet been
approached. On the scholars’ side, a little more care in how their
conclusions are packaged and explained might also be in order.
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